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recent months, public discussion has begun to
I nfocus
on a variety of measures now being implemented, or being proposed, by the present administration, all of which are intended, and designed, to
prevent public disclosure of government information.
Of principal concern to many have been the administration's efforts to restrict the operation of the
Freedom of Information Act, to increase the amount
of material which will receive the designation of
"classified," and to require that all government officials with "authorized access" to "Sensitive
Compartmented Information (S.C.1.)" will sign an
agreement that they will forever thereafter-during
the whole of their lifetimes-submit their writings to
a system now referred to as "prepublication review."
These actions (and others of like intention and effect),
many have argued, pose a serious risk of inhibiting
the free exchange of views within the country and,
for that reason, raise serious First Amendment problems. Claims that this or that policy violates the
principle of freedom of speech and press are now
being heard with greater and greater frequency.
In this statement, I address only the First Amendment implications ·of one of these information
policies-the prepublication review agreements now
being circulated among various departments and
agencies of the federal government. Does this particular policy, instituted by a presidential directive in
March, 1983, violate the constitutional principle of
freedom of speech and press? The answer I give here
is that it does.
As we begin to consider that question, we must
understand in what way the prepublication review
contract is different from the other actions of the
administration with which it has been lumped
together. It is understandable and appropriate that
people should try to draw together a variety of seemingly discrete decisions with regard to government
information policy in order to obtain a better sense of
the overall impact of those decisions; but, in trying
to see the whole we may fail to see, or at least underestimate, the significance of some of its parts. We
emphasize the similarities at the expense of the differences-and the differences in degree may be
profound. Such, at least, is the case with the prepublication review agreements.
Hiding behind the euphemism of the term "prepublication review" is the bare fact that what we are
facing amounts to nothing less than the institution
of an extensive licensing system for publication in
American society. Although this particular licensing
system now being imposed is of more limited proportions than the notorious-and to the American
colonists the infamous-licensing system of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England (against
which John Milton's magnificent Aereopagitica was
directed), it is, in form and effect, a licensing system
nonetheless. Prior to any publicatjon, those affected
by the system must seek the permission of a government official, who will scan the work for improper

disclosures. As must be true with any effective licensing regime, if a work is not submitted prior to
publication, punishment will be imposed, even
though the work on later examination can be shown
to contain no improper communications. Such is the
simple operation of a system we have come to know
in free speech terminology as prior restraint.
For more than six decades now, the courts of this
country have struggled with the task of defining a
workable set of concepts and principles for the First
Amendment. Throughout this time, however, a virtual consensus has formed around one basic idea:
that prior restraints are the least favored, most distrusted, method of proceeding against harmful speech
activity.
Licensing, or prior restraint, it has been repeatedly
noted in the literature and cases, is the one matter,
perhaps the only matter, we can be confident the
framers of the Constitution intended to prohibit by
the free speech clause. Even Blackstone, when in his
Commentaries he defined the extremely limited concept of free speecp in England, said it prohibited
prior restraints: "The liberty of the press is indeed
essential to the nature of a free state; but this
consists of laying no previous restraints upon publications .... " Professor Leonard Levy's study of the
original understanding of the First Amendment concluded that it surely encompassed Blackstone's
notion. 1 Furthermore, in one of the earliest free
speech cases in this century, Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907), Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes observed that "the main purpose" of the First
Amendment was "to prevent all such previous
restraints upon publications as had been practiced by
other governments .... "In Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931), the Supreme Court translated this
view of prior restraints into constitutional doctrine.
Under the "heavy presumption against [their] constitutional validity," 2 licensing schemes have rarely
been upheld. Even when national security information has been the object of the government's quest
for prepublication restraint, the Supreme Court has
given precedence to the principle that licenses are
antithetical to the idea of free speech.3
The primary reasons for this wariness toward
licensing systems are not difficult to understand.
Licensing systems are intellectual roadblocks, operating indiscriminately. By subjecting everyone
encompassed within the scheme to systematic inspection, the vast numbers of innocent along with the
guilty few, they inflict heavy costs of delay and disruption on the communities they touch. Conducting
general searches as a method of uncovering criminal
activity is bad enough in any free society, and barely
tolerated; when they are introduced into the arena
of public debate, the concerns about them increase
exponentially. For then the problems are not just that
added burdens are imposed on our ability to get to
and from places, but that relevant information and
ideas will become stagnant while trapped in the inev35

United States, 444 U.S. 507. In that case, a majority of
the Court upheld the constitutional validity of a prepublication review agreement that Mr. Snepp had
signed when he began working for the Central Intelligence Agency and further held that Snepp' s
violation of that procedure justified the lower courts'
imposition of a constructive trust on the profits
derived after the breach. The present question for the
legislative and executive branches, and in the future
for the Court, is what limit to impose on that holding. The following discussion attempts to identify
that limit.

The relevance of government
employee status

itably delay-ridden review process, that people will
forgo participation in public debate rather than submit themselves to the indignity of obtaining
government permission to speak, and that government officials empowered with control over peoples'
access to public debate will let their judgments be
swayed by political self-interest and smallmindedness.
This last-mentioned risk cannot be overstated. Not
every censor is bad; Rousseau noted in his Confessions that he received editorial assistance from the
French censor, a man of apparently great intellectual
and literary sophistication. But Rousseau's censor
is surely untypical of those who have occupied the
position throughout history, most of whom we may
safely assume resembled the caricature of the petty
bureaucrat we encounter in fiction. For those of
weaker, less lofty natures, a system of prepublication
review offers tempting opportunities for making life
difficult for those they dislike.
Now, granting that licensing systems for speech
activity are-to put it in the form of an understatement-unfavored under the First Amendment, we
are still left with the fact that not every licensing system will be held unconstitutional. For the licensing
scheme now under review, there are several factors to
be considered in deciding whether it falls within
that small category of schemes that will be, or ought
to be, permitted under the First Amendment. Specifically, we must consider the significance of the
following features of the proposed plan: first, that it
will apply only to government employees; second, that
it will be accomplished through contractual agreement,
that is to say, it will apply only to those people who
agree to submit to it; and, third, that it is said to
be justified by an extraordinary governmental interest
and, for that reason, is constitutional.
In assessing the relevance and weight of these considerations, we of course must take into account the
1980 decision of the Supreme Court in Snepp v.
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It is a constitutional commonplace that those
employed by the government must sacrifice some of
their political freedoms, including the freedom of
speech, which, as ordinary citizens, they would
retain under the Constitution. The Hatch Act, which
the Supreme Court has specifically upheld as constitutional (United States Civil Service Comm. v. National
Assoc. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973)), seriously
restricts the political activities of government servants. Yet it has been thought desirable to impose
these restrictions in order to maintain a civil service
free from the distorting, partisan pressures of those
who happen, at the moment, to hold the reins of
power. Members of the military forces must also
forgo many of the freedoms of ordinary citizens.
It would, however, be a grave mistake to conclude
from these examples that those who are employed
by the government are somehow not entitled to any
protection from the First Amendment; or, even more
to the point, that whenever government employees
are the subjects of speech restrictions we need not
demand of the government the same degree, or burden, of justification as we would if an ordinary
citizen were affected. The restrictions that have been
permitted under the Constitution have been authorized because the governmental interest at stake was
viewed as greater with respect to those employees
than to the population generally and not because the
claims of those individuals were somehow worthy
of less regard. In short, we must resist what may be a
common tendency to think that because the subjects
of prepublication review contracts are employees of
the government, the government has a lesser First
Amendment burden to satisfy. You do not accept
second-class status under the First Amendment when
you enter the portals of government employment.
This leads to a related point, one which bears on
the proper emphasis to be placed on the fact that
these prepublication review agreements arise out of
an "employment relationship." The majority opinion
in Snepp makes frequent reference to the notion that
Snepp had a "trust relationship" with his employer,
the CIA, and suggests that, as with any employment
relationship, there were obligations of confidence

implicit in that relationship. It is certainly true that
the common law of agency imposes various restrictions on a former employee's freedom to disclose
information obtained during the employment relationship. Whether under the common law
prepublication review agreements would also be regularly enforced we need not consider here. The only
point I wish to emphasize at the moment is the simple, yet possibly neglected one that what is done
with respect to private employment relationships may
not be permitted when the government is the
employer-precisely because the First Amendment
exists to restrict governmental interference with
speech activity in the society. Because of the First
Amendment, in short, there cannot be a perfect analogy between what private employers can do in the
marketplace and what the government can do there.

The relevance of the contract
In assessing the degree to which the proposed
licensing-prepublication review process runs contrary to our First Amendment values, it seems often
to be emphasized that the system is the product of a
"contract." It is true that the government has not
adopted a regulation or statute imposing the prepublication review obligation on every government
employee who has access to certain intelligence information. Every person affected will have agreed to
submit to the procedure. Should, then, this element
of "agreement" be treated as significant in the First
Amendment analysis?
In the footnote in Snepp where the Court disposed
of the First Amendment issues, the majority appears
to rely on the contractual factor. The footnote points
out that "[w]hen Snepp accepted employment with
the CIA, he voluntarily signed the agreement that
expressly obligated him to submit any proposed publication for prior review" (emphasis added). It goes
on to note that he did not "claim that he executed
this agreement under duress," that "he voluntarily
reaffirmed his obligation when he left the Agency,"
and that, generally, he had "signed" the "agreement"
which he now sought to challenge as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, the footnote intimates that the
contractual element may not have been a crucial factor in the minds of the majority justices when it says
that "even in the absence of an express agreement,"
the agency "could have acted to protect substantial
government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts
might be protected by the First Amendment." What
these "reasonable restrictions on employee activities"
might be, and whether they would encompass a general licensing scheme such as that which Snepp had
agreed to, the Court did not specify. Because of this
vagueness, one comes away from reading the footnote with the sense that the fact of employee consent
to a licensing scheme is important to establishing
its constitutionality.

Should this be so? I do not believe that ultimately
the "contractual" underpinnings of a licensing system, even one such as we saw in Snepp, will or
should prove to be a relevant factor in this area.
Before explaining that judgment, it should be noted
that Snepp, as the Court stated, did not raise a claim
of "duress" or, what is probably more appropriate
' to the circumstances of his case, argue that he had
signed a contract of adhesion which should not be
regarded as a voluntary engagement on his part. The
Court therefore properly assumed a "voluntary"
agreement in that case, and necessarily left undecided
the question whether in another case that assumption might successfully be attacked. Realistically,
however, it seems unlikely that someone like Snepp
could have mounted a viable challenge to the voluntariness of the agreement.
Perhaps a much more credible challenge along the
lines of involuntariness could be mounted by an
employee who had signed a prepublication review
contract while already holding a government position
rather than at the initial stage of accepting employment. Once a career of government service is
underway, only a very hardy soul indeed will refuse
to "accept" the government's "offer" and thereby
expose himself or herself to dismissal or to other possible career disadvantages.
It would not be fruitful to dwell further on this
claim, however, for in the end the matter of
employee "consent" is not the relevant inquiry for a
First Amendment analysis. For even if the employees
can be said to have "voluntarily" signed the contracts, that willing behavior would not aid the
government's position in favor of a licensing system.
To develop the point, we can begin with what I
think is a reasonable assumption-that the government's efforts to secure a contractual limit on the
employee's future speech activities will have an
impact on public dialogue. The nature of public discussion, in other words, will be changed as a result
37

of the government's behavior, not only by reducing
in some measure the risk of improper disclosures
but-as noted before-by introducing the costs of
delay and improper censorship into the system. The
system will be different because of the government's
proposed action.
If one accepts this assumption as true, as I think
one must, then we can move to a second premisenamely, that the First Amendment does not exist
simply to protect the free speech rights of particular
individuals but to serve a general societal, or "collective," interest that we all share as a nation. If the
only function of the First Amendment were to protect
the individual interest of each of us to be free to
speak as we wish, then we would not be concerned if
any one of us "voluntarily" agreed with the government to limit his or her speech freedom. What you
choose to do with your speech rights would be of no
interest to me, at least in First Amendment terms.
If, on the other hand, we all have an interest in preserving the general opportunities open for
expression-or, to put it slightly differently, if we all
have an interest in how we behave toward the speech
activities of others-then we would also have an
interest in overseeing how the government was acting to shape the speech behavior of members of the
society.
That the First Amendment embodies this latter idea
of free speech is clear under the existing jurisprudence. Free speech is not simply concerned with
protecting the atomistic interests of discrete individuals; rather, it establishes a societal, or collective, norm
under which we have committed ourselves to a position of extraordinary-and even extreme-selfrestraint towards speech activity (primarily political
speech activity) within the society. Why this choice
has been made-whether it is because of an interest
we have in getting as much information and as many
ideas as we possibly can or, more generally, because
we learn about our capacities to tolerate behavior
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we find generally distasteful or troublesome-we
need not resolve here. What is significant for the
present discussion is the recognition that there are
serious First Amendment interests at stake whenever
the government undertakes programs that will have
an inhibiting effect on speech activity within the
society-even programs in which that inhibition is
accomplished through inducements or contractual
agreements instead of through more traditional
means like the imposition of punishments.
It cannot ultimately matter that the people who
were approached by the government with its "offer"
of a licensing scheme agreed to sign it "voluntarily."
To make the point with emphasis, we might ask ourselves whether the First Amendment would permit
the government to institute a national plan in which,
in exchange for a tax credit of $1,000, it sought to
obtain "voluntary" agreement on the part of each citizen to refrain from criticizing the government during
the remainder of his or her lifetime. Would such a
scheme be upheld as constitutional, being sustained
on the ground that the only concern of the First
Amendment is to ensure that the state does not
deprive citizens "involuntarily" of their basic freedom
to speak out on public issues? I think not, so long as
the First Amendment embodies its larger social
function.

Is there a sufficient governmental interest?
We come, then, to the principal consideration. It is
not true that under the First Amendment we are
somehow less concerned about what happens to the
speech freedom of government employees; nor is it
determinative that the individuals affected by the
government's program have "voluntarily" sacrificed
their freedom. That determined, we must still ask
whether the government can meets its extraordinary
burden in justifying the extension of the licensingprepublication review system throughout the government, as it now apparently proposes to do.
It must be understood that thiS' is a matter of some
difficulty. By the Snepp decision, a majority of the
Supreme Court has approved a prepublication review
system in a part of the government. It is possible to
say, of course, that the decision is incorrect under
existing constitutional standards and that it may not
withstand the scrutiny of time; but that seems
unlikely. On the other hand, even if the decision
survives as part of our free speech jurisprudence, it
must be given a boundary. It seems clear that Snepp
would not justify a government plan to require every
citizen in the country to submit for prepublication
scrutiny any writings on public affairs so that the
government could ascertain whether, by chance,
some classified information is about to be publicly
disclosed. In such a case, the free speech interests at
stake would certainly overwhelm the government's
purported interest in keeping classified information
secret. The point is, quite simply, one we might per-

haps overlook: that Snepp must be given a limit. And
so the question becomes what that limit should be.
One path to follow in defining the boundaries of
Snepp would be to focus on the categories of material
which the government proposed to protect through
the licensing system, and perhaps additionally on the
nature or degree of access to that material which
those who would be subject to the licensing system
would have. By seeking prepublication review agreements from all government employees who have
"authorized access" to "Sensitive Compartmented
Information," this appears to be the interpretation of
Snepp that the government is following. To the government, in other words, Snepp is an information
case: As long as the government can demonstrate that
the information it seeks to protect would bring great
harm if publicly disclosed, it should be constitutionally free to implement a licensing system for those
who have once had access to that information. At the
present moment, the government's only claim is that
"Sensitive Compartmented Information" is such a
category of information.
Such an interpretation of Snepp, however, seems
both misguided and highly unlikely to prove acceptable to the courts. There are two reasons for this.
The first is quite simply the massiveness of the
intrusion into public discussion under an S.C.1.related licensing scheme-intrusion unaccompanied,
in all likelihood, by a parallel increase in security
for vital government information. Under a recent
General Accounting Office study of 50 U.S. agencies,
it was found that the number of government employees or contractors with authorized access to S.C.I. is
approximately 128,000. This hardly involves a select
group of individuals with access to highly sensitive
government information. Furthermore, this number
by itself does not reveal the full impact of the proposed system of prepublication review on the
openness of political dialogue. We must take into
account the fact that, given the especially high turnover rate among government employees, the number
of individuals subjected to the licensing system will
be increasing yearly. Finally, as for the potential
gains in enhanced secrecy from the proposed system,
the GAO study found that the relevant government
agencies could only point to five instances in the last
five years in which S.C.I. had been improperly disclosed, of which only two, in the judgment of the
agencies surveyed, would have been averted by a
licensing system. This hardly seems the solid basis
the government needs to meet its extraordinary burden of justification.
The second reason Snepp should and will not be
extended to authorize the proposed system is one
that most people would probably not anticipate. The
argument is simply that the legal principle underlying
the government's claim-that the licensing system is
valid because the importance of the area of information to be protected outweighs the burdens the
system imposes on open, uninhibited discussion-is

not one that courts are equipped to decide. It proposes that we launch the courts on a decision-making
course for which they are ill-suited.
One must appreciate the labyrinthine complexity of
the issue the courts will be asked to resolve under the
administration's position. Minimally, there is
involved the task of assessing just how seriously
' harmed the country would be by public disclosure of
some of the information. As Pentagon Papers demonstrated, that in itself is an assignment of great
difficulty and delicacy, one demanding expertise few
judges possess. But Pentagon Papers was actually a far
easier case in comparison to the kind courts would
be considering if we accepted the Administration's
extension of Snepp. An injunction is directed at a
specific set of documents, but a category of information like "Sensitive Compartmented Information"
encompasses a vast, perhaps incomprehensible, range
of documents. Courts must assess not only the range
of importance to national interests of the multitude of
documents in that category, but also the likely impact
on public debate if information in, or related to, that
category had to pass through a prepublication censorship process before it could be publicly released. The
actual operation of the classification process must be
assessed in its entirety. That is an assignment beyond
the competence of the courts.
The administration would appear to be suggesting
at the moment that "Sensitive Compartmented Information" is a peculiarly significant category of
information, one dealing with the "methods and
sources" -or procedure-of intelligence information
gathering and not with the substance of intelligence.
By taking this position they no doubt hope to allay
concerns over an unending case-by-case evaluation of
licensing systems. Procedure-substance distinctions
rarely hold up over time, however, and it is difficult
to see why what the government has actually come to
know through its "methods and sources" should not
contain data that is just as important to our national
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interests as the "methods and sources" themselves.
One can fairly anticipate that precisely that claim will
be raised at some future time, no doubt with a tone
of incredulity toward those who would then seek to
limit the Snepp rule to information about the intelligence-gathering procedures. We would then be on
the path of having to evaluate the competing costs to
the government, and to the First Amendment, of a
variety of licensing schemes for all kinds of government-held information, responding to concerns not
just over national security but over matters such as
individual privacy.
In the face of this serious problem of judicial competence, it is wiser for courts to seek an alternative
method of demarcating the boundaries of Snepp . The
most likely candidate would be that of limiting the
case to the Central Intelligence Agency and perhaps
the few other like agencies within the federal government. Rather than engaging in an evaluation of
categories of information, the courts would extend
the Snepp exception for a prepublication review system to those few groups within the government
whose assigned task is the acquisition of highly sensitive foreign intelligence. This would provide a far
more workable rule for courts, one that reflected a
general understanding, within the government and
the larger society, about these agencies' exceptional
character and one that was most consistent with the
general First Amendment concerns about maintaining
a narrow role for licensing schemes.
In the final analysis, then, the administration's
position ought to be rejected not for its assessment of
the potential harm the society may suffer from
improper disclosure of some information within the
category it has presently selected for a licensing system but rather because it proposes a line of inquirynot just for this case but for others in the future as
well-which is beyond the competence of the judicial
system to administer. A study of classes and categories of information and of the potential for harm
from data disclosures within those groups is unwise
for courts to undertake. The better alternative, the
one with the sharpest available stopping point, is
that of restricting Snepp to certain agencies that
gather foreign intelligence. In all probability, this
seems what the Court in Snepp had in mind when it
emphasized, repeatedly, the special nature of the
employment relationship between agents like Snepp
and an agency like the CIA.

Author's note: Following congressional hearings on
the censorship directive, Congress imposed a temporary suspension on its implementation until April 15,
1984. In February, the White House announced that
the President had decided "not to implement" the
original directive. Several members of Congress,
however, have expressed their intention to continue
to seek legislative restrictions on the future use of
lifetime prepublication review agreements.
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